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THE PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY
by MAX SoIWARTz *
T HE typical normal individual, whether in business
or not, in entering into a business transaction, a con-
tract, or incurring a debt, does not contemplate that the
transactions will ever be involved in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. However, in view of the rising trend in -the number
of bankruptcies,-over 208,000 for the year ending June
30, 1967,1 and increasing in the current fiscal year ending
June 30, 1968-it is in order and in the exercise of prudent
foresight to be acquainted and familiar with the practice
and procedure of a bankruptcy proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Act is made up of 15 chapters. In
addition, there are miscellaneous acts relating to crimes
and offenses, as defined in Title 18 7US. Code, §§ 152-154.
The Act has also been supplemented by General Orders
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court which
have the force of law.2 Insofar as they are not in conflict
with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to a bankruptcy
proceeding.'
*LL.B., New York University; LL.M., Brooklyn Law School; Member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference; Chairman of the Committee on
Bankruptcy of the Brooklyn Bar Association; Vice-Chairman of the Com-
mercial Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association.
'Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts for the year ending June 30, 1967.
2See 4A.W. CoLLI, BANXRUPTCY 1527 (14th ed. 1967).
3The decisions appear to be uniform that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable in bankruptcy proceedings, except where they are
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act. Solove v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
388 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1968); General Order 37 provides that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to bankruptcy in so far as they
are not inconsistent with the Act. 4A W. CoLuma, BANKRUPTCy 1542(14th ed. 1967). Abraham v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1968); Bixby v. First Nati Bank, 250
F.2d 713 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958); I. & I. Holding Corp.
v. Greenberg, 151 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781 (1945);
It re Miller, 262 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Ill. 1967); In re Totem Lodge &
Country Club, 134 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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TYPEs OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Proceedings under Chapters I-VII are designated as
straight bankruptcy proceedings. Of the filings during the
year ending June 30, 1967, 173,884 were voluntary straight
bankruptcies and 1,241 were involuntary straight bank-
ruptcies.4 They are the usual type of proceedings, affect-
ing both business and non-business bankrupts.
A Chapter X proceeding for corporation reorganiza-
tion generally is applicable to a publicly owned corporation
for the relief of debtors, involving a modification of the
capital structure and the claims of secured and unsecured
creditors.5
A Chapter XI proceeding is applicable to a business,
whether a corporation, a partnership or an individual, and
is limited to affecting the rights of unsecured creditors. 6
4Siepra note 1.
5In It re Manufacturers' Credit Corp., 278 F. Supp. 384 (D.N.J.
1968), the court held that Chapter X was intended for the adjustment of
publicly held debts in granting the motion of the S.E.C. to dismiss Chapter
XI proceedings unless the debtors amended their petition or a creditors'
petition be flied to conform the proceedings to Chapter X. On appeal, the
distinction between Chapter X and Chapter XI proceedings was more clearly
delineated. The court pointed out that a proceeding under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act is more appropriate than a proceeding under Chapter
XI where the debt structure is complicated, the debtors are many and inter-
related, the public investors are not few in number and are totally unfamiliar
with the debtors' operations, and the payment of the debt owed cannot be
effectuated by a relatively minor adjustment. Additional safeguards are
provided for in a Chapter X proceeding for the benefit and protection of
the creditors, stockholders and other interested parties by way of investi-
gatory procedures, independent accountants, and the requirement of reports
from the trustee as to his investigation to all creditors, stockholders and
other interested parties. In re Manufacturers' Credit Corp., 395 F.2d 833
(3rd Cir. 1968).
A Chapter X proceeding is designed to rehabilitate a financially em-
barrassed corporation and, when necessary, to recast its capital structure
to eliminate financial problems which have caused it to become a "corporate
cripple." S.E.C. v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965);
General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); S.E.C. v. U.S.
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940). See also 6 W. COLLIR,
BANKRUPTCY §§ 0.08, 0.09, at 90-107 (14th ed. 1967).6See General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); United
States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1963); S.E.C. v.
Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964). In S.E.C. v.
Crumpton Builders, Inc., 337 F.2d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1964) the court
pointed out that Chapter XI proceedings are subject to minimum controls
by the court or their agents and are marked by speed and a minimum of
expense, while Chapter X proceedings, involving publicly held debts, secured
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Chapter XII is available to real property arrange-
ments by persons other than corporations.
Chapter XIII is available solely to wage earners seek-
ing an extension of time to pay their debts, which may
affect both the secured and unsecured creditors.
The other chapters are rarely employed, being appli-
cable to reorganization of public debtors such as muni-
cipalities and taxing agencies, and dealing with railroad
adjustment and maritime commission liens.
The vast majority of all proceedings come within the
provisions of Chapters I-VII, known as the straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
VOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
There are two types of straight bankruptcy proceed-
ings; one voluntary and the other involuntary. The
voluntary petition is available to any person or corpora-
tion, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, banking cor-
poration or building and loan association.'
There is no restriction or limitation upon a debtor in
filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. It may be filed
regardless of the liabilities or assets of the debtor, who
may be either grossly insolvent or solvent.'
and unsecured obligations, and revision of capital structure, are slower and
more expensive and have more safeguards to protect the public and parties.
Chapter XI proceedings may also be directed to be converted into Chapter
X proceedings, or else dismissed. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. S.E.C.,
320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963); William H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally
& Co., 195 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
7 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). This section of the Bankruptcy Act has been
strictly construed as to the amenability of corporations to its provisions
and is limited to the corporations specifically described. It has been held
that the section does not apply to, nor include, any corporation not clearly
within the enumerated classes. Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1955); It re New York & New Jersey Ice Lines, 147 F. 214 (2d
Cir. 1906); It re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925);
it re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Mich.), appeal dismissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1937). Even as
to wage earners, it has been held that this section should be strictly con-
strued. In re Bradford, 268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
s It is not essential that a voluntary bankrupt own any property or
that the voluntary bankrupt be insolvent. In re Hargardine-McKittrick
Dry Goods Co., 239 F. 155 (E.D. Mo.), rev/d on other grounds,
244 F. 719 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917). Likewise it
[ VOL. 43
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No creditor may oppose the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy.9  The only remedy or right available
to a creditor is to move to dismiss such voluntary petition
on the ground that it was filed as a fraud upon the court
and that the maintenance of the proceeding would be an
abuse of the process of the court."0
A voluntary petition by a corporation can only be
filed when authorized by the Board of Directors. No
has been held that a person who owes but one debt and has no
assets, may, nevertheless, become a voluntary bankrupt. In re Schwaninger,
144 F. 555 (E.D. Wis. 1906).
A solvent person may voluntarily have his property distributed among
his creditors under the Bankruptcy Act. In re Fox West Coast Theatres,
88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937); In re Townsend
Builders Supply Co., 144 F. Sup. 717 (E.D.N.C. 1966); In re
Harriman, 31 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); In re Yarbrough, 18 F. Supp.
359 (M.D. Ga. 1937); In re People's Warehouse Co., 273 F. 611 (S.D.
Miss. 1929); In re Pyatt, 257 F. 362 (D. Nev. 1918).
9McClave & Co. v. Carden, 118 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 647 (1941); lt re Fike, 117 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1941); In re
Spohn Motor Co., 158 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Pa. 1958); In Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1965), the court reviewed the
history of 11 U.S.C. §4 indicating that originally creditors could inter-
vene under §41(b) and oppose a petition in involuntary bankruptcy, which
right was given to creditors to protect their interests where affected by
the adjudication. The Act was amended in 1938 by the Chandler Act
which rewrote the section and limited the right to creditors to be heard
in opposition to an adjudication on the ground that the motion of the
creditor in opposing adjudication was to protect preferences or to retain
some advantage at the expense of the other creditors, contrary to the
fundamental purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, the equitable distribution of
assets among all creditors.
10 Porterfield v. Gerstel, 222 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1953); Struthers Fur-
nace Co. v. Grant, 30 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1929); Zeitinger v. Hargardine-
McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667
(1917) ; In re Metal Extrusions, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 51 (S.D. Fla. 1956) ; In
re E. C. Denton Stores Co., 5 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1933). In In re
Joseph Feld & Co., 38 F. Supp. 506, 507 (D.N.J. 1941), the company under a
resolution adopted by two of the three directors, filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy and the third director challenged the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that the filing of the petition required the consent
of stockholders, and upon the further ground that there was no proper
meeting of the Board of Directors and the resolution adopted was invalid.
The court held that "[tihe right of the board of directors to authorize
the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . is dependent upon
the laws of the State in which the corporation is organized. It appears
to be well established that in the absence of any restriction, either under
the charter or statute, a board of directors, without the consent of stock-
holders, may authorize the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy."
However, the court found that there was no lawful meeting of the directors
and by reason thereof dismissed the proceeding, without prejudice to the
bankrupt to avail itself of the Bankruptcy Act in a proper proceeding.
The rule announced in this case has been universally followed.
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action by the stockholders is required unless state law or
the by-laws of the corporation provide otherwse." Where
the Board of Directors is equally divided, the courts have
sustained a voluntary petition filed by the properly consti-
tuted officers of the corporation on a showing that the
Board of Directors is in fact equally divided, and that the
best interests of the creditors of the debtor would be served
by invoking the protection of the Bankruptcy Court. 2
The right to file a voluntary petition may not be
limited or contracted away. Attempts to prohibit such
filing of a voluntary petition, by providing in contracts
and agreements that the debtor may not invoke bank-
ruptcy proceedings, or that the obligation will not be
affected by any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, have
been held to be void as against public policy. 3
:' In In re Raljoed Realty Co., 277 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the
court reiterated the rule that the operation of the corporation must be
left to the Board of Directors and that it is only the board and not a
stockholder that may authorize the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. See
also Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 239 U.S.
165 (1933) ; In re Guanacevi Tunnel Co., 201 F. 316 (2d Cir. 1912);
It re Jefferson Casket Co., 182 F. 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1910).121n In re Dressler Producing Corp., 262 F. 257 (2d Cir. 1919), the
court, after indicating there was a hopeless diversion of views of stock-
holders of equal interests, denied the application to dismiss the proceedings
in bankruptcy even though prior proceedings to dissolve the corporation
had been instituted in the state courts. The court also held there was no
fraud on the Bankruptcy Court in the filing of the petition and in choosing
the Bankruptcy Court as a forum for the liquidation of the corporation,
rather than the state courts. The court also stated that a solvent cor-
poration may have its property distributed among its creditors in the man-
ner provided by the Bankruptcy Act. See also Regal Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. Merlis, 274 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Louisiana Inv. & Loan
Corp., 224 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. La. 1963).
13 State courts cannot by order or injunction prevent a debtor from
becoming a bankrupt. In It re Allied Const, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 141(W.D. Pa. 1948), a proceeding was pending in the state court on an
action brought by creditors, in which a receiver was appointed, when the
voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed. The creditors sought to ques-
tion the right of the directors to authorize the filing of a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. The court, in denying the relief sought by the
creditors, held that a corporation is not deprived of the right to file a
petition in voluntary bankruptcy merely because its property is in the
custody of a state court receiver, even if it was for the purpose of
avoiding the jurisdiction of the state court in having the federal court
take over jurisdiction of the assets of the corporation. The court further
held a corporation is not estopped from filing a voluntary petition because
it is a party to an equity proceeding in the state court, nor may a cor-
poration be prevented by a state court injunction of availing itself of
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The voluntaxy bankrupt falls into two classes: the
business and non-business bankrupt.
As to the non-business bankrupt the problem of wheth-
er to file is far simpler. He is usually a wage-earner. The
debtor may even be a housewife. These types of debtors
have become indebted beyond their means as a result
of consumer financing (purchasing on time of automo-
biles, household commodities and appliances, etc.), per-
sonal loans, automobile accidents, as well as endorsements
and guarantees. The result is that the earnings of the
debtor are insufficient to meet the installment payments,
as well as his current living expenses. Here there is
no problem as to the future course of the debtor. Threatened
by suits, garnishees and loss of his job, the only relief
open to such a debtor is voluntary bankruptcy.
The benefits of the Bankruptcy Act may be invoked
not only by those presently in debt beyond their capacity
to pay on their present or future earnings, but even by
those whose earnings in the future may have a very high
potential." The granting of a discharge to the voluntary
bankrupt relieves him of any charge upon his future
earnings.
Bankruptcy also grants the debtor relief from wage
assignments, garnishments and all his debts upon the grant-
the Bankruptcy Act. Boyce v. Chemical Plastics, Inc., 175 F.2d 839 (8th
Cir.), cert. dcnied, 338 U.S. 828 (1949); In re Dressler Producing Corp.,
262 F. 257 (2d Cir. 1919); In re Yaryan Naval Stores Co., 214 F. 563
(6th Cir. 1914); In re Denton & Haskins Music Pub. Co., 10 F. Supp.
802 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y2 1905); May
v. Merchants & Mechanics Bank, 109 Pa. 145 (1885); Thompson v. Sam-
son United Corp., 203 Misc. 38, 113 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
1411 U.S.C §22 (1964); 1 W. ComLE, BANKRUPTCY 14.03, at 578-84
(14th ed. 1967); In Bank of Elberton v. Swift, 268 F. 305 (5th Cir.
1920), it was charged that the petition was filed to perpetrate a fraud on
the court. This was based on the fact that "[fit was not denied that a
party might take advantage of a voluntary proceeding in bankruptcy for
the very purpose of having any property he might accumulate thereafter
relieved from his debts. .. ." Id. at 307. Here the bankrupt acquired
property shortly after the filing of the petition. The court held, that the
law authorizes the petition to be filed, adjudication to be made and a dis-
charge granted; that the Bankruptcy Act fixes the rights of the parties.
In re Automatic Typewriter & Serv. Co., 271 F. 1 (2d Cir. 1921);
Hindman v. Owl Drug, 33 P.2d 1023 (1934), aff'd on rehearing, 4 Cal. 2d
451, 50 P.2d 438 (1935).
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ing of a discharge. 5 However, it would be a mere futility
to file a petition in bankruptcy if the debtor could not
obtain the relief sought, to wit, a discharge. A debtor is
entitled to a discharge if he has not committed any of the
acts as set forth in § 32(c) of the U.S. Code,"6 and if the
debts incurred by him do not come within the definition of
25 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). In In re Burgess,
.................... F. Supp ..................... (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held that a
bankrupt was entitled to an order restraining the employer from making
further deductions and directing the creditor to return all monies received
from the employer since the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, upon
an application for such relief, after the bankrupt had obtained his discharge.
Further, wages earned and paid after the discharge are not leviable by
creditors holding discharged debts even though suits are pending in the
state court to adjudge the debt non-dischargeable. Until the state court
declares the debts non-dischargeable, the debts are discharged for pur-
poses of levy for payment of debts. In re Cunningham, 57 F. Supp. 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1944); Brenen v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 189 App. Div.
685, 178 N.Y.S. 846 (1st Dep't 1919).
16 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) provides that "the court shall grant the discharge
unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1) committed an offence punish-
able by imprisonment as provided under section 152 of Title 18; or (2)
destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep or preserve
books of account or records, from which his financial condition and busi-
ness transactions might be ascertained, unless the court deems such acts
or failure to have been justified under all the circumstances of the case;
or (3) while engaged in business as a sole proprietor, partnership, or as
an executive of a corporation, obtained for such business mpney or property
on credit or as an extension or renewal of credit by making or publishing
or causing to be made or published in any manner whatsoever a materially
false statement in writing respecting his financial condition or the financial
condition of such partnership or corporation; or (4) at any time subse-
quent to the first day of the twelve months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or
concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his
property, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors; or (5)
in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a dis-
charge or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition
or a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this
Title; or (6) in the course of a proceeding under this Title refused to
obey any lawful order of, or to answer any material question approved by,
the court; or (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets
or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities; or (8) has failed to pay
the filing fees required to be paid by this Title in full; Provided, That
if, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge, the objector shall show
to the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which, under this
subdivision, would prevent his discharge in bankruptcy, then the burden of
proving that he has not committed any of such acts shall be upon the
bankrupt."
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a non-dischargeable debt in accordance with the provisions
of § 35 of the U.S. Code 7
A different problem presents itself as to one engaged
in business. The voluntary business bankrupt encompasses
the individual, partnership and corporation. For one en-
gaged in business the question to be resolved is whether
the reverses and losses, leading to the financial problems,
are temporary, meriting efforts to continue in business, or
whether the prospects are so bleak as to warrant resort to
legal proceedings. Where there is no future prospect for
recovery and profitable operations, a businessman, if an
individual or a partnership, desiring to make a fresh start,
perhaps would have to resort to bankruptcy.
A corporation which is faced with the prospect of
being liquidated and going out of business has the option
of being liquidated, either by an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, under the Debtor and Creditor Law of the
State, or resorting to voluntary bankruptcy. But, atten-
tion is called to the fact that an assignment for the benefit
of creditors is in itself an act of bankruptcy.
In dealing with a business situation, whether individ-
ual, partnership or corporation, if there is a belief that
it has favorable and profitable prospects for the future, and
the debtor has the financial means of carrying on, there
17 11 U.S.C. § 35 sets forth the provision with respect to debts ex-
cluded from the effect of a discharge. They include tax liens; liability
for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension of
renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing
respecting his financial condition made or published in any manner what-
soever with injuries to the person or property of another, or for alimony
due and to become due, or for maintenance or support of a wife or child;
debts that have not been scheduled in time for proof and allowance, unless
the creditor had actual notice or knowledge of the proceeding; debts
created by fraud or embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while
acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity; debts for wages earned
within three months of the commencement of the proceeding due to an
employee and debts for money received as a security deposit from an
employee to secure the faithful performance of the duties of the employee.
This section was amended, effective October 3, 1966, so as to provide for
the dischargeability of debts that were legally due and owing more than
three years preceding the filing of the petition. Tax liens are not dis-
chargeable, nor are taxes for withholding, nor are taxes due and owing
by reason of the bankrupt's failure to file returns, or by reason of the
bankrupt having filed a false or fraudulent return or where he had attempted
to evade or defeat the Internal Revenue Law.
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is an opportunity to affect a settlement either out of court,
which will require the cooperation and consent of every
creditor, or the option to resort to a Chapter XI proceed-
ing, which requires the consent of 51% in amount and
number of creditors filing claims. Discussion of Chapter
XI proceedings is beyond the scope of this paper.
With respect to a voluntary bankruptcy, the amount
of the indebtedness is immaterial. s  The voluntary non-
business bankrupt must merely meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the Act, which are that he shall have his
residence or domicile in the district where the petition is
being filed for the longer portion of the preceding six
months than in any other district. 9 As to the individual
business bankrupt, his place of business is an additional
jurisdictional alternative where the petition may be filed.2"
Where a petition has been filed, the subsequent death
of the bankrupt, or his insanity, will not affect the conduct
of the proceedings but they will go forward until fully
administered.2
18 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1964). See supra note 8.
1911 U.S.C. §11(a)(1) (1964). See 11 U.S.C. §55 (1964); In re
Fada Radio & Elec. Co., 132 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Saper v.
Long, 131 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Section 11(a)(1), though
phrased in terms of jurisdiction, defines proper venue for bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Read together with the provisions of § 55, the provisions with
respect to the place of filing of a petition, whether voluntary or involuntary,
based on residence, domicile or having a principal place of business, have
been held to constitute merely provisions as to venue, and it is not juris-
dictionally defective if a petition is filed in the wrong district. Thus it has
been held that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction regardless of resi-
dence, or domicile and may retain or transfer the case according to "the
interests of justice," or in the interest of the parties. See Hawaiian
Investors v. Thorndal, 339 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1965); In re S.O.S. Sheet
Metal Co., 297 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Eatherton, 271 F2d
199 (8th Cir. 1959).
2011 U.S.C. §11(a)(1) (1964). See Higgins v. State Loan Co., 114
F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1940); In re Evans, 85 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1936).
21 Under the present provisions of the Bankruptcy Act the estate of a
decedent is not entitled to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. In re
Hiller's Estate, 240 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1965); In re Mulero's Estate,
143 F. Supp. 504 (D.P.R. 1956). In Hull v. Dicks, 235 U.S.
584 (1915), it was held the administration of the bankrupt estate is un-
affected by the death of the bankrupt subsequent to the filing of the
petition, subject, however, to his family being entitled to the exemptions
granted by state law. See also 11 U.S.C. §1(4) (1964); In re Evanishyn,
107 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1939); Siegel v. Wells, 55 F.2d 877 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 549 (1932); In re Clinton, 41 F.2d 749 (S.D. Cal.
1930).
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INVOL-UNTAnY BANKRUPTCY
Any natural person, except a wage earner 22 or farmer,23
or any money business or commercial corporation, except a
building and loan association, municipality, railroad, insur-
ance or banking corporation, may be the subject of an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy if said person, business
or corporation owes debts in excess of $1,000.00." Other
requirements are: that he is insolvent; that he has com-
mitted an act of bankruptcy within four months of the
filing of the petition; and that he has resided or has his
domicile or principal place of business for a longer portion
of the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition in the district where the petition is filed than in
any other judicial district."
2211 U.S.C. §1(32) (1964) defines "wage earner" as "an individual
who works for wages, salary or hire, at a rate of compensation not ex-
ceeding $1500 per year," In re Shear, 139 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
2 3 1 re Hinrichs, 314 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1963) ; It re White, 238 F.
Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1965).
24 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964); it re Hare, 205 F. Supp. 881 (D. Md. 1962);
In re Eastern Supply Co., 170 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1959); It re
Pauline's Fashion Salon, 121 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
25 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). The four-month period for the filing of a
petition for involuntary bankruptcy does not, with respect to concealment
or removal of property, expire until four months after the concealment,
fraudulent transfer or removal is discovered by creditors. With respect to
preferential transfers, the four-month period for filing of petition by
creditors expires four months after the preferential transfer has been per-
fected within § 96(a) and (b). Hotel Halcyon Corp. v. Acme Supply Co.,
36 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1929); In re Estate of Northwest Mills, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Ark. 1968). Debtor by settling with most of his creditors
could not prevent dissenting creditors from filing involuntary petition by
asserting his liabilities were less than $1,000. Liabilities would be determined
as of date of commission of act of bankruptcy within four months of filing
of petition. In re Jacobson, 181 F. 870 (D. Mass. 1909). A person's
status was to be determined as of the date of the act of bankruptcy. Virginia-
Carolina Chemical Co. v. Shelhorse, 228 F. 493 (4th Cir. 1915); In re In-
man, 57 F.2d 595 (D. Wyo. 1932).
In construing § 95b respecting the filing of the petition in bankruptcy by
three or more creditors having provable claims, not contingent and in
excess of $500, the court, in reviewing the status of petitioning creditors
based on a judgment under appeal, held the judgment creditors qualified to
act as petitioning creditors. The court held the term "not contingent as to
liability," as used in § 95b is different from and broader than the claims
based on instruments in writing or judgments; that creditors whose claims
are based on written agreements or other transactions, not yet reduced to
judgment are qualified to act as petitioning creditors. However, the court
found that the judgment creditors by failing to mention the security held by
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It is important to stress that the mere fact that the
debtor is insolvent, that his liabilities exceed the total of
his assets, that he is unable to pay his debts as they mature
in the regular course of conduct of business, does not give
a creditor the right to file an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy. In addition to being insolvent, the debtor must
have committed an act of bankruptcy within four months
of the filing of the petition. The acts of bankruptcy, as
set forth in § 21 of the U.S. Code may be summarized
as follows:
(1) A fraudulent transfer or concealment of assets.
(2) A preferential transfer of money or property.
(3) Permitting, while insolvent, a creditor to obtain
a lien on property through legal proceedings and not vacat-
ing or discharging the same within 30 days from the date
the lien was obtained.
(4) Permitting a creditor to obtain a lien on prop-
erty through legal proceedings and failing to vacate or
discharge the same within five days before the date set for
the sale of the property.
(5) The execution of an assignment for the benefit
of creditors.
(6) Permitting, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
the appointment of a receiver or trustee of debtor's assets
while insolvent and unable to pay his debts as they mature.
(7) Admitting, in writing, his inability to pay his
debts and willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt.
In preparing the involuntary petition in bankruptcy
it should be noted that alleging an act of bankruptcy in
the language of the Bankruptcy Act is insufficient. Failure
to set forth facts and specific information with respect to
the property conveyed or transferred, the name of the
them in filing the involuntary petition, were deemed to have waived the
security and the judgment claims pending appeal. In re Walton Plywood,
227 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Wash. 1964). In In re Eastern Supply Co., 170
F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1959), the court held an involuntary petition could
be filed on behalf of petitioning creditors by an attorney duly authorized to
execute and file the petition on their behalf. It also held that where the
original petition was sufficient on its face it could be amended to correct any
defects that were not jurisdictional.
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party to whom the transfer was made, the amount involved,
or the nature of the property transferred in connection
with alleging a fraudulent transfer, concealment or pref-
erential transfer is insufficient and has been held to be so
defective as to warrant the dismissal of the petition. 6 The
courts may grant leave to amend, but there is grave danger
that the amendment may speak of the date of the filing of
the original petition so that more than four months may
have elapsed between the act complained of and the date
of the amended petition, which will result in a dismissal
of the proceedings.2
Alleging the act by which the debtor is charged with
permitting a lien to be obtained through legal proceedings
26Dworsky v. Alanjay Bias Binding Corp., 182 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1950),
wherein the court did not permit amendment of the petition and dismissed
the same. In In re R. V. Smith Co., 38 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1941),
the court held that the transfer of assets to a creditor was not an act of
bankruptcy nor a preference where the creditor paid back to the bankrupt
cash, or made loans in excess of what he received from the bankrupt during
the four-month period before the filing of the petition. In Abramson v.
Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967), the court, in granting leave to file
an amended involuntary petition, held that the amendment should be read
liberally, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and held that
the amendment related back to the date of the original filing of the petition,
so as to bring the act of bankruptcy, as well as preferential acts, within the
four-month period of the filing of the petition. See also Glint Factors, Inc.
v. Schnapp, 126 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Gaynore Homes, 65 F2d
378 (2d Cir. 1933) ; It re Fuller, 15 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1926) ; In re Ideal
Mercantile Corp., 143 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 828 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957); In re Heltman-Thompson Co.,
83 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mich. 1949). Under § 95, notice must be given to all
creditors before a petition may be dismissed by consent for want of prosecu-
tion or upon the application of the bankrupt and this applies in both in-
voluntary and voluntary proceedings. Upon this application, creditors may
intervene to oppose the dismissal and to join additional petitioning
creditors in the involuntary petition.
In It re Adams, 53 F. Supp. 982 (D. Pa. 1944), the court held that the
involuntary petition must set forth sufficient facts as to the need for the act
of bankruptcy so as to apprise the alleged bankrupt of what he will be
required to meet, otherwise the petition would be defective.
27 South Suburban Safeway Lines v. Carcards, Inc., 256 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.
1958); It re Oster, 216 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Thomas, 211
F. Supp. 187 (D. Col. 1962). In Abramson v. Boedeker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th
Cir. 1967), the court not only permitted the involuntary petition to be
amended, but held that it was effective as of the date of the original filing
of the petition with respect to the act of bankruptcy and preferential
transfers.
Where the amendment to the involuntary petition alleges a new act of
bankruptcy, the adjudication dates from the date of the filing of the amend-
ment and not from the date of the filing of the original petition. Wynne v.
Rochelle, 385 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1967).
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is insufficient and defective unless the data with respect
to the recovery of the judgment, the court wherein recov-
ered, and the property upon which it became a lien are
set forth, even though in very general terms.2"
The mere fact that a judgment has been recovered is
not sufficient to create a lien or an act of bankruptcy,
unless the debtor owns real estate. Neither will the issu-
ance of execution under a judgment to a marshal or sheriff
constitute an act of bankruptcy, unless the execution or
levy becomes a lien on property, personal or real.2"
Stress is placed upon the need to set forth facts and
not rely on mere statutory language in alleging acts of
bankruptcy. Laymen as well as many lawyers labor under
a misapprehension that creditors have the right, as a mat-
ter of course, to, file an involuntary petition where the
debtor is insolvent and unable to pay his debts as they
mature. They also make the mistake of assuming that the
recovery of a judgment in and of itself constitutes an act
of bankruptcy.
If the debtor has over 12 creditors the petition must
be joined in by at least 3 creditors with provable claims,
fixed as to liability and liquidated as to amount, aggregat-
ing over $500.00. ° If there are less than 12 creditors then
28Hamilton Steel Prods. Co. v. Yorke, 376 F2d 463 (7th Cir. 1967);
In re Ideal Mercantile Corp., 143 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244
F.2d 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1967). A judgment does not
become a lien until recorded and if recorded after bankruptcy, it is void as
a lien against the trustee. Allen v. Camp Ganeden, 214 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.
1954); In re Flushing-Queensboro Laundry, Inc., 90 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1937) ;
Weitzel Flooring Corp. v. Getz, 31 F.2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1929); In re New
Lots Sash & Door, 3 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).2 9 1n re Ideal Mercantile Corp., 244 F.2d 828 (2d Cir.), aff'g, 143
F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957). A judg-
ment does not become a lien until recorded and if recorded after bankruptcy,
it is void as a lien against the trustee. Hamilton Steel Prods. Co. v.
Yorke, 376 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1967).
30 11 U.S.C. §95(b) (1964); Syracuse Engr. Co. v. Haight, 110
F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Blount, 142 F. 263 (E.D. Ark. 1906);
Leighton v. Kennedy, 129 F. 737 (1st Cir. 1904) (petition filed by one
creditor dismissed where it was established there were more than 12
creditors and three or more creditors failed to join in petition). Theis v.
Luther, 151 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781 (1945). While
some courts have held that small current claims should not be taken into
account in determining the number of creditors of an alleged bankrupt, In re
Blount, 142 F. 263 (FD. Ark. 1906), other jurisdictions have held that
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an involuntary petition may be fried by one creditor."1
The petition must be executed in triplicate and verified
under oath by general unsecured creditors. A secured
creditor may act as a petitioning creditor only to the
extent of the unsecured portion of his claim, which should
be specifically indicated in the petition as otherwise there
may be a claim asserted later that by joining in the involun-
tary petition as an unsecured creditor he waived his
security."
A bankruptcy proceeding upon an involuntary petition
is initiated by the fling of an orignal and two duplicate
petitions with the clerk of the court. The clerk then issues
subpoenas which, together with the duplicate petitions, are
delivered to the United States Marshal for service upon the
alleged bankrupt. The attorney should be armed with the
information as to the names and addresses, both business and
home, of the officers of the alleged bankrupt corporation, or
the partners of a partnership or of the individual bankrupt.
The subpoena is returnable within 10 days and the bankrupt
has 5 days after the return date to answer or otherwise plead
to the involuntary petition.3 Where the subpoena cannot be
served by the United States Marshal, he makes a return of
non-service and the attorneys can then proceed to serve
the alleged bankrupt by publication. Where the bankrupt
is a corporation, either domestic or foreign, service of the
subpoena may be made upon the Secretary of State.
creditors holding bona fide claims for small personal expenses should be
counted in determining whether an involuntary bankruptcy could be filed by
one creditor, or whether three creditors were required. Theis v. Luther,
151 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1945). See aso 3 W. CoLi~mR, BANKRUPTcY f 59.20,
at 626-29 (14th ed. 1968); In re Branche, 275 F. 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1921);
Grigsby-Grunow Co. v. Hieb Radio Supply Co., 71 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1934);
It re Kirk, 198 F. Supp. 771 (D. Pa. 1961).31Northeastern Real Estate Sec. Corp. v. Goldstein, 163 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1947); It re Garrett & Co., 134 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1943).
32 U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28 (1947); Mt.
Vernon Hotel Co. v. Block, 157 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Central
Ill. Oil & Refining Co., 133 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1943); In re Hayes, 127
F. Supp. 514 (D. Ala. 1955) ; In re Mann, 117 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1952) ;
It re Silver, 109 F. Supp. 200 (F.D. Ill. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 259 (7th
Cir. 1953); In re Lawton, 119 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. W.Va, 1954).
3311 U.S.C. §41 (1964).
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The unwarranted filing of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy can have serious repercussions, particularly if
the petition is opposed and dismissed. Where the debtor is
successful in having the petition dismissed he has the right
to recover costs, expenses and damages and may also have
the right to institute an action for malicious prosecution. 4
The order adjudicating a debtor a bankrupt may not
be collaterally attacked nor may the adjudication be va-
cated in a collateral attack. Instead, the order of the
referee may be appealed by way of a petition for review,
which must be filed within 10 days from the entry of the
order of the referee, unless for cause shown the period is
extended, and an application for such extension must be
filed within the 10 day period.36 Appeals from the orders
of the District Court may be taken to the United States
Court of Appeals. The appeal is perfected by the filing of
a notice of appeal within 30 days from the service of the
order of the court, where served with notice of entry
within 5 days of its entry, or 40 days where there is
service of the order with notice of entry. In effect, the
maximum period for filing an appeal is 40 days, whether
or not served with any notice as to the entry of the order.37
Creditors do not have the right to oppose the fling
of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. This is limited
34 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 78(n) (1964); It re Joslyn's Estate, 171 F.2d 159(7th Cir. 1949); In re Swofford, 112 F. Supp. 893 (D. Minn. 1952); In re
Childs Co., 52 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); In re Sabul, 36 F. Supp. 95(D. N.J. 1940); In re Summit, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 495 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
35 Cornwell Press, Inc. v. Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, Inc., 75 F.2d
276 (2d Cir. 1935). The orders entered in the bankruptcy proceeding are
res judicata of the subject matter before the court as between the parties
and those standing in privity thereto. Myers v. International Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 64 (1923) ; In re Imperial "40Wf' Nat'l Inc., 391 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir.
1968); Hummel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 151 F.2d 994 (7th Cir.
1945); In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1955).
36 11 U.S.C. § 67 (c) (1964); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l Inc., 391 F.2d
163 (3rd Cir. 1968) ; St Regis Paper Co. v. Jackson-, 369 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1966) ; In re Beverly Hills Security Investments, 233 F. Supp. 737 (D. Ariz.
1964).
37 11 U.S.C. § 48 (1964); FEa. R. Civ. PRoc. §§ 73-76. The provisions of
§ 48 with respect to filing a notice of appeal within 40 days after the entry
of the order of the district court is mandatory and jurisdictional. If the
appeal is not taken within 40 days the court has no jurisdiction and must
dismiss the appeal. Hart v. Hedrick, 390 F.2d, 10 (5th Cir. 1968).
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solely to the debtor.38  However, an involuntary petition,
as well as a voluntary petition, cannot be dismissed upon
the application of either the bankrupt or the petitioning
creditors, except upon notice to all of the creditors of the
bankrupt."9 In order to proceed with an application to
dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding the bankrupt must file
a list, under oath, of all of his creditors setting forth
their addresses, and notice of this application must be
given to all creditors, as set forth in said list or schedule.
While the time for the hearing may be fixed by the court
in an order to show cause, if the application is by way
of notice of motion it should be on 10 days notice to the
creditors. However, if the bankrupt can obtain the con-
sent of all creditors, the petition may be dismissed upon
consent.4"
PROCEDURE UPON Tr=i FMILING OF PETITION
Similar to the requirements with respect to the filing
of an involuntary petition, the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion and the schedules and statement of affairs that must
accompany same should be prepared and executed in trip-
licate, under oath, and then filed in triplicate with the
clerk of the court, paying the filing fee of $50.00. It is a
rare situation where the court will permit the filing of
aS ll U.S.C. §41 (1964); In re Carden, 118 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941); In re T. J. Ronan Co., 114 F. Supp. 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). Creditors cannot oppose a petition in involuntary bank-
ruptcy either directly or through collateral attack. Wynne v. Rochelle, 385
F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1967). 11 U.S.C. §41 (1964).
3911 U.S.C. §95(g) (1964).40 n re Riordan, 95 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1938); In re Thorpe, 12 F.2d
775 (7th Cir. 1926); In re Burns, 36 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See In
re Sig. H. Rosenblatt & Co., 193 F. 638 (2d Cir. 1912) where the bankrupt
filed an answer to an involuntary petition and neither the petitioning
creditors nor the bankrupt put up the deposit required by the referee as
indemnity, and nothing further was done. The court denied the subsequent
motion of the bankrupt to dismiss the proceeding for lack of prosecution and
also denied the counterclaim of the petitioning creditors to strike out the
answer, and entered an order of adjudication. The court further held that
as the bankrupt had failed to file the verified list of creditors, and had
failed to give notice as required under § 109(g) to the creditors, his motion
to dismiss was denied.
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a voluntary petition without schedules and statement of
affairs.
After the filing of the petition the next step to be taken
is to protect the assets of the estate and creditor interests.
If there are perishable or movable assets an application
should be made to the court for the appointment of a
receiver. The receiver is a temporary court officer func-
tioning until the first meeting of creditors and the election
of a trustee, who is the permanent officer in charge of
the administration and liquidation of the estate.4 The
court will grant such an application where it finds it is
necessary and requisite to protect the assets of the estate."
If a voluntary petition has been filed, the application for
the appointment of a receiver may be made by any cred-
itor, without any bond being required."3 Where an in-
voluntary petition has been filed not only may one of the
petitioning creditors, but any creditor may apply for the
appointment of a receiver, furnishing, however, a bond
for costs to the court. The application for the appoint-
ment of a receiver may be made either simultaneously with
the filing of the involuntary petition or at any time there-
after." It may be made before the entry of the order of
adjudication.45
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act require the
scheduling of every liability and every asset belonging to
or in which the bankrupt has an interest. 6
4111 U.S.C. § 11(a) (3) (1964); hnt re F. P. Newport Corp., 216 F.2d
344 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'g 123 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Cal.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
972 (1955); In re F.P. Newport Corp., 137 F. Supp. 58 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Levin v. Barker, 122 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813
(1942); Int re Olsen, 70 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1934).
4 2 Harris v. Capehart-Farnsworth Corp., 207 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1953); In
re National Republic Co., 109 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1940).
43 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1964); In re Ziegler Printing Co., 6 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
44 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1964); In re Oakland Popcorn Suppy, Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 665 (N.D. Cal. 1963); In re Premier Floor Covering Co., 35 F. Supp.
901 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); In re Zeigler Printing Co., 6 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Pa.
1934); In re D & E Dress Co., 244 F. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
45 It re Oakland Popcorn Supply, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 665, 669 (N.D. Cal.
1963); In re Ziegler Printing Co., 6 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
46 11 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
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The entry of the order of adjudication follows as a
matter of course in connection with the filing of a volun-
tary petition." With respect to the involuntary petition,
if no answer is interposed within five days after the return
date of the subpoena, then an order of adjudication in
bankruptcy is entered upon the involuntary petition, and
the proceedings referred to a referee." If an answer is
to be interposed, it should be filed within five days after
the return date of the subpoena.49
The right to a trial by jury is limited solely to the
question of insolvency and the demand therefor must be
made at or before the time of the filing of the answer.
If the demand is not so made, the right to a trial by jury
is deemed waived." All other issues may be tried either
by the court or referred to a referee to make the adjudica-
tion or dismiss the petition. 1
Upon the entry of the order of adjudication, whether
in a voluntary or involuntary proceeding, the referee
sends out notices of a first meeting to be held not less
than 10 days nor more than 30 days after the date of
adjudication in bankruptcy.52
The receiver, upon his appointment and pending the
first meeting of creditors, takes charge of the property
and assets for the purpose of protecting the interests of
creditors until either the petition is dismissed (where he
is appointed prior to the entry of an order of adjudica-
tion) or the trustee in bankruptcy qualifies.
47 11 U.S.C. §41(g) (1964).
48 11 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
1911 U.S.C. §41(b) (1964).
50 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1964). See In re Maley Tire Co., 273 F. Supp. 369(N.D.N.Y. 1967), where the demand for a jury trial was served after the
answer to the involuntary petition had been filed. It was held that the
demand was not timely made and the debtor not entitled to a jury trial.
The written application for a jury trial must be filed at or before the time
within which the answer must be filed.
A jury trial in bankruptcy is limited to the insolvency of the debtor and
the commission of an act of bankruptcy. The demand for a jury trial must
be in writing and filed either prior to or simultaneously with the answer to
the involuntary petition. Wynne v. Rochelle, 385 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1967).G1 11 U.S.C. §41(d) (1964).
S211 U.S.C. §91(a) (1964).
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The receiver is authorized to prosecute or defend suits
or proceedings by or against a bankrupt." Since the re-
ceiver is a temporary court officer it is rare that he is ever
authorized to institute any suit or proceeding other than
in connection with the liquidation of the assets that have
come into his possession.
The receiver is authorized and may immediately pro-
ceed upon his appointment to liquidate the assets of the
estate. It is usually by a sale at public auction, but he
also has the right to dispose of the same on offer heard
before the referee, on due notice to all creditors. 4  Nor-
mally, neither the court nor the referee will authorize a
sale of assets prior to the entry of an order of adjudica-
tion, except upon the consent of the alleged bankrupt.5
While there is a right of private sale, it is rarely invoked
and it is strictly limited to highly perishable merchan-
dise."6
If, at the time of the filing of the petition, the bank-
rupt is subject to law suits, as well as garnishments, an
application may be made to the referee for an order to
stay the further conduct of any suit or proceeding in the
state court against the bankrupt, pending the granting
or denial of a discharge to the bankrupt."7
53 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (3) (1964) ; In re Rosenbaum MirrorMfg. Co., 11 F.
Supp. 314 (D.C.N.Y. 1935), aff'd, 86 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1936); In re
Marcus, 11 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1926); Maynor v. Schaefer, 244 Ala. 111, 11
So. 2d 846 (1943).
54 11 U.S.C. §§ 94, 110, 2(a) (3) (1964); Bragg v. Gerstel, 148 F.2d 757
(5th Cir. 1945), where the sale was conducted without notice to the creditors,
the sale was set aside as improvident and as working a legal fraud on the
creditors. Normally, a judicial sale will not be set aside for inadequacy of
price unless other circumstances are present, indicating unfairness or
impropriety. Mason v. Ashback, 383 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1967); In re
Little & Ives Co., 262 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); In re Solantikas, 33
F.2d 200 (W.D. Pa. 1929).
55 11 U.S.C. § 110(f) (1964); 6 REMIN TON BANKRUPTCY § 2543 (5th
ed. 1952); In re Peerless Finishing Co., 199 F. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); In re
Desrochers, 183 F. 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1911); It re T. C. Kelly Dry Goods Co.,
102 F. 747 (E.D. Wis. 1900).
56 11 U.S.C. § 110(f) (1964); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253
(1937); In re Layton, 221 F. Supp. 667 (D. Ariz. 1963); In re Bernhard
Altmann Int'l Corp., 226 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Paper
Corp. of America, 138 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), as to form of
notice of sale-private or public; In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603 (D. Mass.
1953).
5711 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
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EXAMINATIONS
After the filing of the petition, the receiver, or if no
receiver has been appointed, a creditor, has the right
under § 44 of the U.S. Code to conduct examinations of
the bankrupt and others with respect to the property,
assets and effects of the bankrupt. Within the scope of
these rights and the provisions of § 44, the examination
includes not only the bankrupt and the officers of the
banlaupt, but also witnesses, who may include employees,
debtors, creditors, both secured and unsecured, and any
other party regarding transactions with the bankrupt and
its property, assets and effects. The examination has
been described as a "fishing expedition" which indeed
it is, being almost unlimited in scope and in time.5 8
In conducting these examinations, the bankrupt and
witnesses can be called upon to produce their books, rec-
ords, original instruments, cancelled vouchers, financial
statements and any and all documents in connecton with
all transactions had with the bankrupt. The scope of the
examination is broad, general and unlimited as to time,
in order to afford the creditors and the receiver the means
and the opportunity of tracing and ascertaining the bank-
rupt's activities, assets, liabilities and transactions.
THH TRUSTEum
As indicated, upon the entry of the order of adjudi-
cation the proceedings are referred to a referee who sends
out the notices for the first meeting of creditors, at which
the creditors may elect a trustee.59 The appointment of a
trustee terminates the receivership.6 0  The trustee is
5811 U.S.C. §44 (1964); In re Prudence Co., 92 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.
1937); It re Youroveta Home & Foreign Trade Co., 288 F. 507 (2d Cir.
1923); In re Insull Utility Investments, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
5911 U.S.C. §§72(a), 91(a) (1964).
60 F.P. Newport Corp. v. Sampsell, 216 F.2d 344 (9th Cir.), aff'g 123
F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Cal. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 972 (1955); In re
Olsen, 70 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Stanton v. Busch, 59 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.
1932).
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elected by the vote of a majority in amount and number
of the claims of general unsecured claims present and
voting at the first meeting." Hence, it is requisite for
those who desire to participate in the nomination and
election of a trustee to have their claims in order, and
be present at the meeting. If an attorney is to vote the
claims, then a power of attorney should be executed by
the creditors, which requires an acknowledgment. If
more than one claim is being voted by a creditor, a com-
mittee of creditors or an attorney, then an affidavit must
be submitted in accordance with the local rules of the
court.2 The rules should be examined, for their require-
ments are different as to the creditor, committee and at-
torney. Otherwise, the attorney, the creditor and the
committee will be limited to voting on proof of claim.
Secured creditors are not entitled to vote except to the
extent that their claims may be unsecured, which is meas-
ured by the excess of the indebtedness over the value of
the security held by them."
The trustee is vested with the right and the duty of
liquidating all of the assets of the estate into cash, con-
ducting examinations into the affairs, acts, conduct and
transactions of the bankrupt, instituting actions for the
recovery of preferential and fraudulent transfers or for
the recovery of assets belonging to, the estate, and the
enforcement of any claim or cause of action that may be
an asset of the estate.64 These assets will include inherit-
ances and executory devises passing to an individual
bankrupt within six months of the filing of the petition,
judgment in negligence actions recovered prior to the filing
of the petition, and all property that could have been
61 While a trustee is to be elected by a majority in amount and number
of claims present and voting, if neither candidate has a majority, the referee
may appoint. In re Haupt & Co., 379 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1967). See In re
Eloise Curtis, Inc., 388 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1967), where the referee appointed
the trustee after disapproving of the trustee nominated by the creditors.
62 U.S. DisT. CT. R. (bankruptcy) 15 (E.D. and S.D. of N.Y.).
63 11 U.S.C. § 92(b) (1964).
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 75(a), 96, 107, 110 (1964).
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transferred by the debtor or levied upon, or sold under
judicial process upon a claim of a creditor. 5
c5 The line of demarcation is the date of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The trustee's title in and to all of the bankrupt's assets vests as
of that date. The rights of all parties are to be determined as of the time
the petition is filed. In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 946 (1951); Tuffy v. Nichols, 120 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941); City of Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d
483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 602 (1939).
The test to be applied as to the property of a bankrupt passing to the
trustee is two-fold; (1) could the property have been transferred by the
bankrupt; or (2) levied upon and sold under judicial process against him,
or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered. If either condition can be
met the property passes. Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949) ;
Adelman v. Centaur Corp., 145 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Gillaspy v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 109 Miss. 136, 67 So. 904 (1915). If neither one of the
conditions can be met the property does not pass to the trustee. In re
Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1939); Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170 (4th
Cir. 1933).
A verdict was recovered by the bankrupt in a personal injury
action prior to the filing of the petition but final judgment was not entered
until after the filing of the petition. Under this situation the court held
the recovery was not transferable nor leviable and did not pass to the
trustee. Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1933).
In Allen v. Tate, 6 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1925), a contingent interest under
a will, which was not transferable nor leviable, was held not to pass.
Property not owned by the bankrupt but acquired subsequent to the
filing of the petition does not pass to the trustee but is the property of the
bankrupt, clear of all claims that are discharged by the bankruptcy proceeding.
Siegel v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966); Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474
(1913); In re Scranton Knitting Mills, 23 F. Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1938);
In re Mitchell, 42 Am. B.R. 658 (N.D.N.Y. 1919).
But, not coming within this rule and passing to the trustee are income
taxes paid prior to the filing of the petition, Siegel v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375
(1966), as well as any property inherited within six months after the filing
of the petition.
The bankrupt's interest in a tenancy by the entirety, tenancy in common
or joint tenancy will pass to the trustee if the same was transferable or
leviable within the test above stated. Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178
(1942) ; Fetter v. U.S., 269 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Dioguardi v. Curran,
35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929).
As to trustees' interest in spendthrift trusts see Eaton v. Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); In re Morris, 204 F. 770 (2d
Cir. 1913).
Passing to the trustee is the right to unpaid but earned wages and
salary, at the time of the filing of the petition. In re Cohen, 276 F. Supp.
889 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
Separation pay due to the bankrupt at the time of the filing of the
petition is property passing to the trustee. In re Durham, 272 F. Supp.
205 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
The trustee succeeds to the rights of the beneficiary bankrupt in a
testamentary trust under which he has a present right to income and a con-
tingency as to the corpus, subject, however, to the state laws as to
exemptions. In re Dollard, 275 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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The trustee, upon his appointment, must qualify by
filing his bond within five days of his appointment." He
should then procure a copy of the schedules filed by
the bankrupt to ascertain the assets and liabilities that
have been scheduled. This should be followed by a demand
of all the assets of the bankrupt estate, together with the
books and records of the bankrupt.
It is the trustee's duty to take possession of all of the
assets of the estate and books and records of the bankrupt
immediately upon his appointment." However, exempt
property does not pass to the trustee."' The Bankruptcy
Act recognizes the allowance of exemptions granted a
bankrupt in the state of his domicile by the laws of the
United States as well as the laws of the state in force at
the time of the filing of the petition. 9 The right to claim
property exempt is limited to individuals and not to part-
nerships nor corporate property. No exemption will be
allowed out of any property transferred or concealed in
fraud of creditors and recovered by the trustee."0 Exemp-
tions vary from state to state, depending upon state law."'
Where the bankrupt was the beneficiary of an inter vivos trust created
by his mother with the power of appointment, other than to himself, his
creditors or his estate, the court held the bankrupt had only a special power
of appointment, that he was not vested with ownership rights in the corpus of
trust and the corpus did not pass to the trustee. The court held that as to
the income of the trust, the trustee was vested with the interest the
bankrupt could have transferred or the creditors could reach by legal
process. Drummond v. Cowles, 278 F. Supp. 546 (D. Conn. 1968).
6611 U.S.C. §78(a) (1964).
6711 U.S.C. §§25&75(a) (1964).
8 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). In It re Ragozinno, 38 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.N.Y.
1941), the bankrupt assigned a policy of insurance not scheduled by him,
after the filing of the petition, to secure a loan. The trustee was successful
in setting aside the transfer and sought to obtain the cash surrender value
of the policy. By reason of the concealment of the policy and its recovery
by the trustee, the court denied the bankrupt's claim of exemption as to the
policy and its cash surrender value.
69 Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959); Seiden v.
Southland Chenilles' Inc., 195 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1952); Turner v. Bovee,
92 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1937); In re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 652 (1932) ; In re Star Spring Bed Co., 243 F. 957 (D.N.J.
1917); In re O'Hara, 162 F. 325 (M.D. Pa. 1908).
70 11 U.S.C. §24 (1964).
71 Homestead exemptions are granted but limited in value to $1,000 in
Maine, New York, North Carolina and Ohio. They are unlimited as to
value in Florida. There are no homestead exemptions in Connecticut, Dela-
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With respect to the administration of the estate, the
trustee may retain counsel, who is entitled to compensa-
tion only if he has been retained pursuant to the order
of the court."'
The trustee and his attorney then should forthwith
proceed to reduce the assets of the estate to cash. This
entails the sale at public auction of the physical assets
whether real or personal or both. In practically all in-
stances the application for leave to sell should be on the pe-
tition of the trustee calling for the appointment of an
appraiser and the designation of an auctioneer to conduct
the public sale, on notice to all creditors.73
The sale will be consummated if the gross proceeds
of the assets realize at least 75% of the appraised value."'
If less than 75% is realized, an application must be made
to the referee to approve or disapprove of the sale, and
good cause must be shown to have the sale approved, other-
wise a resale will be ordered.
One of the prime duties of the trustee is to investi-
gate into the conduct, property, assets and effects of the
bankrupt. This will entail the examination of the bank-
rupt individually, or the officers of the bankrupt corpor-
ation, and witnesses. The examinations are usually com-
menced at the first meeting of creditors, and then ad-
journed for more extensive examinations. The purpose of
the adjournment is to afford an opportunity to the trustee
and his attorney to examine into the books and records of
the bankrupt. Where the affairs of the bankrupt are com-
ware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island. Nevada has a $10,000 homestead exemption. California
may even have a higher value homestead exemption. As to recognition of
State Homestead Law by the Bankruptcy Court, see Elliott v. Ostman, 340
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1965); Esten v. Cheek, 254 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958).
72U.S. Disr. CT. R. (Bankruptcy) 10 (S.D. & E.D. N.Y.); General
Order 44, General Orders and Official Forms in Bankruptcy.
7311 U.S.C. §§94, 110(f) (1964); Bragg v. Gerstel, 148 F.2d 757 (5th
Cir. 1945); In re Clark, 257 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Va. 1966); In re Park
Distributors, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Cal. 1959); In re Winthrop Mills,
106 F. Supp. 464 (D. Me. 1952).
74 11 U.S.C. § 110(f) (1964); Frazier v. Ash, 234 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.
1956); Reid v. King, 157 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1946); In re Superior Mush-
room Growers Corp., 228 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1964); In re New
Strand Theatre Inc., 109 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
plicated and require explanation, the trustee may be au-
thorized to retain an accountant. Again, on the applica-
tion of the trustee, in accordance with the local rules and
General Orders/ 5 an order of the referee must be procured
in order to assure the accountant compensation for his
services.
The examination of the bankrupt's officers and wit-
nesses is without limit as to extent or time, in. order to
enable the trustee and his attorney to ascertain the nature
and the scope of the business affairs of the bankrupt,
transfers of property, loans and exchanges, purchases and
sales, receipts and disbursements.
If, as a result of these examinations, it appears there
have been preferential transfers within four months of the
filing of the petition, then the trustee is under an obliga-
tion to institute suits for the recovery of the preferences,
either in the state court or federal court, wherever juris-
diction over the prospective defendant may be obtained. 6
75U.S. DIsT. CT. R. (Bankruptcy) 11 (S.D. & E.D.N.Y.); General
Order 44, Official Forms in Bankruptcy.
7 11 U.S.C. §§96(a), (b) (1964). No preference was found by the
court where there was an exchange of security, and where there was no
diminution of the estate as a result of the transaction. First Natl Bank of
Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 336 (8th Cir. 1967).
The court permitted the transactions on a running account between
the bankrupt and the bank to be set off against each other, even though
within four months, and as a result of such set-offs found that there was
no preference. Farmers Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
Where the right of set-off exists there is no preference or fraudulent
transfer. Rosof v. Roth, 169 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d
829 (2d Cir. 1959) (with court holding there is no preference where there
is an exchange of mutual debits and credits). See Mayo v. Pioneer Bank &
Trust Co., 297 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1961), for an extended discussion as to the
elements of a preference and the burden on the trustee to obtain a recovery.
Payments and transfers to officers and directors of the bankrupt, to a
corporate creditor of the bankrupt in which these same men were officers
and directors, or in favor of a group of employees, were held to constitute
preferences recoverable by the trustee under section 96 of the U.S.
Code. Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, 185 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
In Ricotta v. Burns Coal & Bldg. Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.
1959), payments to a mechanic lienor, even upon an unfiled mechanics lien
within four months of the filing of the petition were held not to be a
preference, the court pointing out that the payments were made in lieu of
the filing of the lien which would have been valid under 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1964).
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A payment on account of a past indebtedness within four
months of the filing of the petition, with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe on the part of the transferee
that the transferor is insolvent, or his insolvency is inmin-
ent, and that the effect of the payment or transfer will
enable him to receive a greater percentage upon his in-
debtedness than other creditors in the same class, consti-
tutes a preference recoverable by the trustees.
77
If there has been a transfer of property while insol-
vent, within one year preceding the filing of the petition,
The trustee must establish and prove every element of a preference.
If any one of the elements of a preference as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)
(1964) is wanting, the trustee has failed. In re Steinberg, 138 F. Supp. 462
(S.D. Cal. 1956).
77 Sloan v. Garrett, 277 F. Supp. 235 (D.S.C. 1967). Where a preferential
payment is returned or repaid by the creditor who is also an officer of the
bankrupt corporation, within a few days after the taking or receipt of the
payment, this creditor-officer would not be required to repay the same sum
again to the trustee. Hassen v. Jonas, 373 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1967);
Kapelus v. Joint Venture, 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967).
In Cooper Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 379 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1967), the
court held that payments on a running account, within four months of the
filing of the petition, where not directed to be applied against current con-
tract obligations, were preferential. Here the creditor had extended credit
after the receipt of the payments. This decision appears to be contrary
to the decisions in many other circuits, including the Second Circuit.
It is not a preference for a bank to set off the deposit or the balance
to the credit of the bankrupt account at the time of the filing of the
petition, in the absence of fraud or collusion between the bank and the
bankrupt Hence it is not a preference for the bank to set off the deposits
against indebtedness owing by bankrupt. Farmers Bank of Clinton v. Julian,
383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
In It re R.V. Smith Co., 38 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1941), the court
held that the transfer of assets to a creditor was not an act of bankruptcy,
nor a preference where the creditor paid back to the bankrupt cash, or
made loans in excess of what he received from the bankrupt, during the
four-month period before the filing of the petition.
The law of the state where the transfer was made controls determina-
tion of when the transfer is perfected for the purpose of determining
whether there has been a voidable preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1964). Holahan v. Gore, 278 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1968).
Payment and discharge of a valid mechanic's lien within four months
of the filing of the petition does not create or result in a voidable preference.
Sloan v. Garrett, 277 F. Supp. 235 (D.S.C. 1967); Ricotta v. Burns Coal
& Bldg. Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1959).
The essence of a voidable preference is the depletion of the bankrupt's
estate available to the remaining creditors, and a suit to recover a preference
may be brought by the trustee, either in the federal court or state court.
The element of reasonable cause to believe on the part of the transferee as
to the bankrupt's insolvency is as of the time of the transfer. That is, the
time of the delivery of the property. Sloan v. Garrett, 277 F. Supp. 235
(D.S.C. 1967).
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for an inadequate consideration, then the trustee is author-
ized to institute a fraudulent transfer proceeding under
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as under
state law for the recovery of such transfers. 8
The lien, levy or attachment, made or created within
four months of the filing of the petition, regardless of the
date of recovery of judgment upon which such lien, levy or
attachment is based, while the debtor is insolvent, is void
as against a trustee and may be set aside and the proceeds
recovered by the trustee.7 9
78Under 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1964), a transfer without fair con-
sideration while insolvent, made within one year of the filing of the petition,
can be set aside and recovered by the trustee as a fraudulent transfer. In re
Southern Metal Products Corp., 26 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
In Segrest v. Hale, 164 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), the
transfer was initiated by letter in 1933, but not perfected by recordation
until 1941, after the bankruptcy of the transferor. The court held the
transfer came within § 107(d) (2), and was void as to the trustee.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1964), a conveyance or obligation is
fraudulent, without regard to actual intent, if not made for a fair considera-
tion and the debtor is insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result thereof.
The test, therefore, is fraud in law as distinguished from fraud in fact;
constructive fraud a distinguished from actual fraud. If there is a lack
of present fair consideration and insolvency, there is a conclusive presump-
tion of fraud. See also Dering v. Williams, 378 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1967);
Marshall v. Showalter, 375 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1967); Epstein v. Goldstein,
107 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1939); Rudin v. Steinbugler, 103 F.2d 323 (7d Cir.
1939); Wilson v. Robinson, 83 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Kayser, 177
F. 383 (3d Cir. 1910).
In Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968), it was held that
the trustee was entitled to recover from the seller of corporate stock of the
bankrupt the amount received by the seller from corporate assets as pay-
ment for the purchase price. Such transaction was held to result in a
transfer which was fraudulent as to corporate assets. Here the transaction
took place within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and was
found to be without fair consideration. It was held to be a fraudulent
transfer voidable by the trustee under § 107(d) (2) (a). See also Dwyer v.
Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1954); Caesar v. Bernard, 156 App.
Div. 724, 141 N.Y.S. 659 (1st Dep't 1913).
9 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). Set-offs or payments received within four
months held to be a preference notwithstanding the running account between
the parties. Shaw v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967) ;
In re Morasco, 233 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1956); Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d
571 (2d Cir. 1954); Zamore v. Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1952)
(under §§ 110(c) and (e)); Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington,
179 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1950); Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945) (involving a pledge); In re American Cork In-
dustries, 54 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1931) ; In re Huston, 143 F. Supp. 40 (N.D.
Ohio 1956); England v. Moore Equip. Co., 94 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal.
1950) ; In re Greenberg, 48 F. Supp. 3 (D. Mass. 1942). Contra, Farmers
Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
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A transfer made or a debt incurred by a debtor while
insolvent, within four months of the filing of the petition,
is fraudulent if made or incurred in anticipation of the
filing of the petition and with the intent to use the con-
sideration obtained from such transfer or such debt to
enable a creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than other creditors of the same class, and if the transferee
or obligee knew or believed the debtor intended to make
such use of the consideration."0 In effect, if the debtor
borrows $2,500.00 from his friend "A", secured by a secur-
ity interest on his automobile, for the purpose of paying
off the loan owed by the debtor to the bank, which is un-
secured, such transaction and the security interest will
be deemed to be fraudulent, if it takes place within
four months of the bankruptcy of the debtor, and
"A" has knowledge or reason to believe his loan will be
so used.
It is important to note that while a trustee may move
to set aside a lien, he is also given the right to reserve
the same for the benefit of the estate as against subordinate
or subsequent liens.8"
1021 (1967); Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co. v. Coggin, 78 F.2d 471 (4th
Cir. 1935).
A judgment does not become a lien until recorded, and if recorded after
bankruptcy, it is void as a lien against the trustee. Hamilton Steel Prods.
Co. v. Yorke, 376 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Wilks, 196 F. Supp.
640 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
80 To void a transfer under § 107(d) (3) of the U.S. Code, the court
must find that the transfer meets all of the requirements of the section.
There must be an express finding that the transfer was made in contempla-
tion of the filing of the petition under the Bankruptcy Act, and findings
that the debtor intended to use the consideration to enable a creditor to
obtain a preference, and that the transferee knew or had reason to believe
that the consideration was to be so used. All of these conditions were
found in In re Cesari, 217 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1954).
The distinction should be noted between the voidability as a preference
of the transfer to the unsecured creditor, and the voidability under § 107(d)
(7) of the transfer of assets to secure the creditor supplying the funds to
make the payment. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917); Dering v.
Williams, 378 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1967); Marshall v. Showalter 375 F.2d
529 (10th Cir. 1967); In re Cesari, 217 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1954); Traut-
wein v. Mandel, 127 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1942); In re Atlas Foundry Co.,
155 F. Supp. 615 (D.NJ. 1957).
s1Connell v. Walker, 291 U.S. 1 (1933).
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If, as a result of the examinations, it appears that
there is an unaccounted discrepancy between the liabilities
and the assets, the trustee can call upon the bankrupt tQ
account for the discrepancy. This proceeding is known as
a "turnover proceeding." It is brought before the referee,
usually by an order to show cause, but also may be by
way of a petition and notice of motion. The application
will call upon the bankrupt to account for the discrep-
ancy between his assets and liabilities at a starting point,
normally within a reasonable period of time prior to the
filing of the petition, and the assets and liabilities of the
bankrupt at the time of the filing of the petition. The
proceeding is founded on the books and records of the bank-
rupt, financial statements issued by the bankrupt, assets
and liabilities as of the starting date, and if, after giving
due credit to all transactions from that date to the date
of the filing of the petition, there is an unaccounted dis-
crepancy of assets, then the bankrupt is called upon to
either account for the discrepancy or to turn over the
asset. This proceeding should be brought as promptly as
possible after the filing of the petition.
While the courts have held there is a presumption of
continued possession of assets, this presumption weakens
and fades as time elapses. In addition, the burden is on
the trustee to establish present liability of the debtor to
comply with any turnover order. Before the court will
grant a turnover order the trustee must establish his claim
by a clear preponderance of evidence. Unless the trustee
can show that the bankrupt has the ability to comply with
the turnover order the court will be most reluctant to
grant any such order.
The consequences of a turnover order are most severe.
It cannot be collaterally attacked. Failure to comply with
the lorder will result in contempt proceedings, for failure
to comply with the order of the court. While contempt
proceedings are civil in nature, the bankrupt may be im-
prisoned for an indefinite term and the time of his in-
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carceration in a civil jail will rest in the discretion of
the court."
The trustee can also question the validity of any lien
or encumbrance affecting the property and assets of the
bankrupt. If the property was in the possession of the
bankrupt at the time of the filing of the petition, and
hence came into the possession of the bankruptcy court,
and the receiver-trustee, the court has "summary" juris-
dition. This is merely a designation given to a proceeding
brought on before the referee, by way of motion or order
to show cause to the secured creditor, for leave to sell the
asset that may be encumbered, free and clear of the lien
of the encumbrance, and to hold the proceeds in a special
fund pending the determination of the validity of the lien
82 On the subject of turnover proceedings and contempt for failure to
comply with the turnover order, see Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948);
Oriel v. Russell, 273 U.S. 358, 362 (1929); First National Bank of Clinton
v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir. 1967); Farmers Bank of Clinton v.
Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (196) ; In re
Standard Coal Mining & Converters Corp., 178 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1950);
Seligson v. Goldsmith, 128 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1942); In re California
Motors, 122 F. Supp. 885 (E.D.T.Y. 1954); In re Wire Corp. of America,
131 F. Supp. 586 (D.N.J. 1955).
As to turnover against a third party for assets claimed to belong to the
bankrupt estate, the prime question before the court will be whether there
was actual or constructive possession in the court as to the property sought
to be turned over and whether the respondent's adverse claim is bona fide
or colorable. See Schwartz, Turnover and Contempt Proceedings ilt the
Light of the History of Maggio v. Zeitz, U.C.L.A. INrrRA. L. REv. 75
(1958); Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper
Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U.S. 478 (1940); May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925). In Sahn v.
Pagano, 302 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819 (1962), the court
held that where the officers of the bankrupt, on the eve of the filing of the
petition, extracted $700,000 in exchange for their personal notes upon which
they put in an adverse claim in opposition to a turnover motion against
them on the part of the trustee, it is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the
mere assertion of an adverse claim. The court may enter upon a preliminary
inquiry to determine whether the adverse claim is real and substantial, or
merely colorable, and if merely colorable, proceed to adjudicate the merits
summarily.
Here the court found the claim to be baseless in fact and in law, that
it had jurisdiction to determine the matter summarily and directed a turn-
over against the bankrupt. Subsequently the bankrupt's officers were held in
contempt for failure to comply with the turnover order and their applica-
tions for a release and for habeas corpus were denied on the ground of the
gross looting of the bankrupt estate and the incredible explanation of the
officers as to the disposal of the loot. See also United States v. Fitzpatrick,
330 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1964).
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or encumbrance."3 If the trustee can establish that there
is an equity, or there is a valid doubt as to the validity of
the lien or encumbrance, the referee may grant the appli-
cation and direct the property to be sold free and clear
of the lien, and that the proceeds be held in a special fund
pending the determination of its validity. 4 The proceed-
ings are thereafter conducted before the referee, who has
the jurisdiction to determine not only the validity but the
amount due upon the lien or encumbrance."
If the property was not in the possession of the bank-
rupt at the time of the filing of the petition, but in the
possession of the secured creditor, then the court does not
have summary jurisdiction and the trustee must resort to
a "plenary" suit. This is a suit in the appropriate state
or federal court having jurisdiction over the defendant to
try out the issues with respect to the validity and the
amount due upon the lien or encumbrance."
83 If the foreclosure proceedings are instituted prior to bankruptcy, the
state court retains jurisdiction and the proceedings may not be enjoined or
restrained by the bankruptcy court. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931).
The proceedings may, however, be stayed to determine the validity of
the lien. If bankruptcy precedes any action on the part of the secured
creditors, then the secured creditor cannot proceed with the foreclosure of
the security, whether real estate or personal property, without permission
of the bankruptcy court. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734
(1931).
Where the mortgagee merely commences foreclosure proceedings by
publication, without taldng possession as authorized by state law, before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, the referee has jurisdiction to authorize the
sale of the real estate free and clear of the lien of the mortgage. The court
founded this decision upon the fact that the property had not come into the
possession of the state court prior to the filing of the petition. In. re
Bowden, 274 F. Supp. 729 (D. Me. 1967).
s41,; re Kaminsky, 281 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Wis. 1968). Where the
trustee has shown that the property is in the possession of the court and
that there is an equity, the court will order a sale free and clear of liens,
the proceeds to be held to await the determination of the validity and
amount due upon the lien. See, e.g., Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S.
225 (1931); Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Rogers Milk Prods. Co., 21 F2d 414
(2d Cir. 1927) ; In re Nat'l Grain Corp., 9 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1926) ; In re
George T. Bell & Co., 29 F. Supp. 989 (M.D. Pa. 1939).8 5 
n re Prindible, 115 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1940); Seaboard Nat'l Bank v.
Rogers Milk Prods. Co., 21 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1927).
s Where the property was under the jurisdiction of the state court in a
pending suit at the time of the filing of the petition, the bankruptcy court
does not have summary jurisdiction but the trustee will be relegated to
instituting a plenary suit. Carney v. Sanders, 381 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1967).
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It should be noted that bankruptcy does not super-
sede nor oust a receiver in a pending foreclosure proceed-
ing at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.87
On the other hand, a foreclosure proceeding may not be
instituted after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
without leave of the bankruptcy court."8
Under these sections and the general provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee stands not only in the
position of the bankrupt, but also in the shoes of the cred-
itors, with the right to attack payments and transfers as
preferences, or fraudulent as against the creditors under the
provisions of both the Bankruptcy Act and State Law.8 9
Suits under §§ 96, 107 and 110 of the U.S. Code, by
the trustee, are plenary suits that can only be instituted
in the appropriate federal or state courts within the statu-
tory period of limitations as set forth in § 29 of the U.S.
Code."
Where the foreclosure proceeding of a mortgage was instituted more
than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the bank-
ruptcy court does not have summary jurisdiction and will not enjoin nor
restrain the foreclosure proceeding. The trustee will be relegated to the
state court proceeding. Schmitt v. Blackwelder, 379 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1967).
On the subject of summary or plenary jurisdiction, see Cline v. Kaplan,
323 U.S. 97 (1944); May v. Henderson, 263 U.S. 111 (1925); Schwartz
v. Horowitz, 131 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1942).8 7 Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943).
88 Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber
Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
89 The trustee stands in the shoes of creditors in order to pierce the
corporate veil and recover a fraudulent transfer. Maley v. Carroll, 381 F.2d
147 (5th Cir. 1967).
The trustee is vested with the rights of creditors in addition to those
of the bankrupt. Connell v. Walker, 291 U.S. 1 (1934); Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 236
U.S. 288 (1915); United Calif. Bank v. England, 371 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1966); Schneider v. O'Neal, 243 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1957); David v.
Lawrence Cedarhurst Bank, 204 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
877 (1953); City Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 190 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1951).
The trustee may assert the right of creditors existing prior to the date
of bankruptcy only if such a creditor actually exists. Lewis v. Manufac-
turers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).9 0 McDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932);
Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268 (1920); Chatz v. Freeman, 204 F.2d 764
(7th Cir. 1953); Lowenstein v. Reikes, 60 F.2d 933 (2d Cir.), cert. delied,
287 U.S. 669 (1933).
Illustrative of state laws vesting rights of action in the trustee under
§ 110 are Article 10 of the Debtor & Creditor Law of New York and the
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The trustee must also proceed to collect the accounts
receivable, and where there are any causes of action in
favor of the bankrupt, institute or take the steps necessary
to enforce collection and liquidation of the same.
The bankruptcy court will not grant any relief where
the bankrupt is in default in a supplementary proceeding
examination in the state court, or where he is fined for
any default or contempt in such proceeding. The bank-
ruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to relieve the bank-
rupt of his default, contempt, or any fine assessed in such
proceeding. 1
Reference has been made to the right of a bankrupt
to obtain a stay of suits pending against him at the time
of the filing of the petition.2 A stay is obtained on an
provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, now in effect in
every State and Territory other than Louisiana.
Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code it has been held
that the distinction between the various types of securities, such as chattel
mortgages and conditional bills of sale, have been eliminated and are
immaterial. In re Yale Express Systems, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
A trustee in bankruptcy has the right to void any security interest not
perfected so as to be valid as against subsequent security interests and
lienors, in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The trustee has been successful in having the security interest declared void
for improper filing. In re Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa.
1962); It re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see 1n re
United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966), where the court
found that the proper security agreement in the form of a trust receipt had
been executed, sufficient to cover the inventory and proceeds; that it had
been properly filed and, therefore, was valid as against the trustees. See also
In re Ferro Contracting Co., 380 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1967).
In Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967), and in In
re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967),
the courts held the after-acquired property clause in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code would be recognized by the bankruptcy court. Where the
security interest covers after-acquired property and was valid under state
law, it would be enforced as against the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act.
The court, in each instance, upheld the validity of the after-acquired
property clause in each of the security agreements as against the trustee's
contention that the same was invalid under the provisions of § 96 of the U.S.
Code. Accord, In re White, 283 F. Supp. 208 (D. Ohio 1967).
91 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1964); Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631 (1882);
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 381 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.
1967) (referee has jurisdiction to grant stay orders both prior to the
adjudication as well as subsequent thereto); In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1944) ; In re Thomashefsky, 51 F.2d 1040
(2d Cir. 1931) ; In re Metz, 6 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1925) ; In re McRoberts,
17 F. Supp. 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); In re DeGraaf, 22 F.2d 163 (W.D.
Mich. 1927).
92See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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application to the referee to stay the further conduct of
any suit or proceeding pending in the state court against
the bankrupt. Where a garnishee is outstanding, the stay
will enjoin further collection upon the garnishee by the
creditor but the employer will be directed to deduct and
hold the funds pending the hearing and granting or denial
of a discharge to the bankrupt. The application for the
stay, which may be ex parte, must indicate that the claim
upon which the suit is pending in the state court is sched-
uled, that it is dischargeable and that there is no default
nor fine levied in the state court proceedings. Upon the
granting of the discharge, application should be made to
the court for the purpose of having the referee direct the
funds that have accumulated since the filing of the petition
to be returned to the bankrupt."3
The trustee, likewise, can apply for a stay with respect
to any suit or proceeding pending, affecting the assets of
the estate."'
93 Middleton v. Cox, 331 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1964); In re Palter, 151 F.
Supp. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); It re Brecher, 19 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1937).
94 11 U.S.C. §11(a)(15) (1964), which provides as follows: "Make
such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to
those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement
of the provisions of this title: Provided, however, That an injunction to
restrain a court may be issued by the judge only."
It is well to note the differences in the application of 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) and 11 U.S.C. §29(a). Section 29(a) pertains to stays of "in per-
sonam" suits that are pending against the bankrupt at the time of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, and are based on claims which would be
dischargeable. Section 11(a)(15), amongst other things, applies to suits
instituted after the bankruptcy petition has been filed. Donald F. Duncan,
Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 381 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1967) (Referee hasjurisdiction to grant stay orders both prior to adjudication as well as
subsequent thereto); Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hospital, 27 F. Supp. 20 (W.D.
Va. 1939); It re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905); 1 W. CoLIME,
BANIRUPTCY 301, 315, 1138-9 (14th ed. 1967).
Even a creditor has been permitted to apply for a stay, to wit, the
stay of a discharge of the bankrupt to obtain a lien on exempt property.
Yet, recently a court refused to stay a discharge of the bankrupt in order
to allow the creditor time to obtain and perfect a lien in a state court pro-
ceeding against exempt property based upon the rule of Lockwood v.
Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), which was the authority for such
an action, holding that the Lockwood decision was intended to apply and
authorize a stay only to enforce a lien theretofore existing, or where there
had been a waiver of the exemption of the property upon which a lien was
sought, and was not intended for the purpose of authorizing the creation
of a lien on exempt property. Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.
1967).
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In connection with suits to be instituted by the trustee
for the recovery of any assets, the trustee is bound by the
statute of limitations of the state that would be applicable,
except that he is granted a minimum of two years limi-
tation from the date of adjudication. 5  This period of limi-
tation may extend the time to bring a suit under state law,
but is a bar to any suit on the part of the trustee founded
solely upon §§ 96, 107 and any other bankruptcy section
of the U.S. Code."
In short, it is the trustee's duty to liquidate into cash,
as promptly as possible, all of the assets belonging to the
bankrupt estate.
TiaD LCRBDITORS
In the administration of the estate, it is the obligation
of the creditors to file claims, if they desire to participate
in any distribution of the assets of the bankrupt. The time
for the filing of claims is limited by statute to six months
from the date of the first meetingYr Unfortunately, this
is ja statute of limitations without any discretion vested
in the referee or the court to extend the time for the filing
of a claim. Where no claim is asserted either to the court,
referee or the trustee, or his attorney, prior to the expir-
ation of six months, any claim sought to'be filed thereafter,
will be treated as a "late claim" not entitled to participate
in any dividend distribution until all timely filed claims
have been paid in full. This bar applies alike to all creditors,
unsecured as well as priority claimants, whether for wages
95 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1964). The two-year statute of limitations after
adjudication applies to suits and proceedings by the trustee under §§ 96 and
107 of the U.S. Code and may also apply to summary proceedings on the
part of the trustee. Herget v. Central Natl Bank Co., 324 U.S. 4
(1945).
A suit for the turnover of assets, as well as to recover a preference,
is subject to the two-year statute of limitations, as set forth in §29 of the
U.S. Code. Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
887 (1951).
96Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887
(1951); Halpert v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y.
1953).
9711 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1964).
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or taxes. It also applies to creditors who have not been
listed and have not received notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings. While it is true that their claims will not
be discharged, this is of very little comfort where the
bankrupt is a corporation that has gone out of business.
The status of all claims with respect to their provabil-
ity, allowability and amount, is within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Bankruptcy Court."8 The trustee is obliged to
examine the claims filed. If there is any question as to
the validity or amount of the claim, objections should be
filed and brought on for a hearing by the trustee as soon
as is practicable.
If a claim has been filed by a creditor who is charged
with having received a preferential payment or fraudu-
lent transfer, the objection to the claim may be based on
such grounds." The decision of the referee with respect
to the preference or transfer will be res judicata should
any independent suit against the creditor be necessary.100
The referee does not have jurisdiction to grant afflirm-
ative judgment where an offset or counterclaim does not
arise out of the same transaction and situation upon which
the claim filed is based. In such a situation, however, the
referee's decision is res judicata. That is, a plenary suit
must be brought upon this affirmative defense or counter-
claim in a court having jurisdiction over defendant, in
which proceeding a motion for summary judgment
will lie by reason of the fact that the issues have already
Os Referee has jurisdiction to pass upon not only the principal of the
secured claim to determine its validity and the amount due, but also the
interest and attorneys' fees that may be owing in connection with the en-
forcement thereof. Even if the terms are harsh but valid under state law
the contract will be enforced. 11 U.S.C. §§ 93, 103, 104 (1964); Kapelus
v. Joint Venture, 377 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1967); Rutas Aereas Nacionales
S.A. (Ransa) v. United States, 373 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Ad-
vance Printing & Litho Co., 277 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 387 F.2d
952 (3rd Cir. 1967).
1-" 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1964).
10OThe referee's determination of the counterclaim of the trustee on an
objection filed to a claim filed in the bankruptcy proceeding by the creditor
is res judicata in a plenary suit, warranting the granting of a motion for
summary judgment against the defendant-creditor. Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323 (1966); Giffin v. Vought, 175 F.2d 186 (3rd Cir. 1940); Schwartz
v. Levine & Malin, 111 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1940).
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been determined and there is nothing to be tried. However,
where the offset or counterclaim arises out of the same
transaction or contract as the claim asserted, the referee
has jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief and a judgment
in favor of the trustee as against the claimant.'
CLOSING THE ESTATE
After the status of all claims has been fixed and all
assets liquidated into cash, the estate is ready for closing
and the trustee's final report and accounts must be pre-
pared and filed with the referee. A hearing thereon will
be had on notice to all creditors, with respect to the trus-
tee's final report and accounts, applications for allowances
to attorneys and accountants, and for a declaration of a
final dividend to the creditors.
The distribution of the funds realized during the ad-
ministration of the estate is regulated by § 104 of the U.S.
Code. The order of priority runs as follows:
First is the payment of the commissions, allowances
and reimbursement of expenses incurred by the receiver-
trustee, attorney for the receiver, attorney for petitioning
creditors, attorney for the trustee and accountants.
Second are wage claims which include wages and
commissions earned within three months prior to the fing
of the petition, not exceeding $600.00.°2
Third is the reimbursement for costs and expenses to
creditors in successfully opposing a bankrupt's discharge,
or the confirmation of a plan of arrangement or revoking
of the same.
101 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). The jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court is not only to pass upon the validity and the amount of
the claims filed, but extends to any counterclaim or offset against the claim,
even as to a tax refund as against the Director of Internal Revenue. Rutas
Aereas Nacionales, S.A. (Ransa) v. United States, 373 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.
1967); Giffin v. Vought, 175 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1949); Schwartz v. Levine
& Malin, 111 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1940).
102 Claims of employees for vacation pay and also for severance pay are
part of wages entitled to priority. They have also been held to be ex-
penses of administration. Straus-DuParquet, Inc. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Wkrs., 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967); L. 0. Koven & Bros Inc. v.
Local 5767, United Steel Workers, 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).
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Fourth are taxes of the Director of Internal Revenue,
state and municipality, all on an equal plane.
Fifth are debts, other than taxes owing to the United
States or any governmental agency, such as to the Federal
Housing Authority and the Small Business Administration,
and rent owing to a landlord entitled to priority under
applicable state law, limited, however, to three months rent
prior to the filing of the petition.
Claims that are provable and entitled to participate
in any dividend distribution include debts based on con-
tracts or breach of contract and judgments. Likewise
provable is a judgment founded upon a negligence claim
in suit at the time of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy.03
Contingent debts founded on contracts and claims for
anticipatory breaches of contracts, including leases, are
provable, limited, however, to the difference between the
rent reserved in the lease and the reletting value, not ex-
ceeding one year."'
DISCHARGE
Independent of the administration of the estate by
the trustee, the matter of the discharge of the bankrupt
will go forward before the referee. The notices usually
sent out by the referee with respect to the first meeting
also provide for a date for the filing of specifications of
objections to the bankrapt's discharge.' Usually this
date will be extended, upon application and written order,
while the examinations of the bankrupt and witnesses are
pending. Only after the examinations are concluded
will the final date be set for the filing of specifications.
If specifications are filed, then the bankrupt may file
exceptions to the sufficiency of the specifications. The
referee has the right, in the exercise of his discretion,
to permit amendments of the specifications filed, but not
203 11 U.S.C § 103 (1964).
204 Id.
105 11 U.S.C §94 (1964).
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to add new grounds not theretofore alleged. Specifications
of objections to the discharge will not be entertained,
except for good cause shown, if sought to be filed after the
expiration of the time fixed for their filing.08
The trial of the specifications is had before the
referee. In the first instance the burden is on the ob-
jecting creditor to go forward and to'establish a prima
10611 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1964); General Order 32, General Orders and
Official Forms in Bankruptcy. In Lerner v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank
of Milwaukee, 294 U.S. 116 (1934), the court in construing § 32(b) as
amended and General Order 32, said: "The language of the amended
Order is mandatory; it is controlling in circumstances like those here pre-
sented; strict compliance should be accorded. Under Order XXXVII, and
permissive provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, we think the Courts may
exercise discretion sufficient for the successful conduct of proceedings in
varying circumstances." Id. at 119.
In Northeastern Real Estate Securities Corp. v. Goldstein, 91 F2d 942
(2d Cir. 1937), the court held that while specifications could be amended
after the expiration of the time fixed for filing of the same, a new ground
of objection was not an amendment--even though of the same class as
originally pleaded-but the court can extend the date for the filing of
specifications.
In In re Leach, 197 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. Ark 1960), the court, after
indicating that the specifications must set forth facts and not be alleged
in the language of the statute, held that while new grounds may not be
added specifications could be amended to set forth the specific facts in sup-
port thereof, under the liberality amendments, provisions and Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in bankruptcy. However,
where the specification was barren of any facts, the court held the referee
was warranted in dismissing the specifications.
In Rameson Bros. v. Goggin, 241 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1957), the
court held "that a Referee has the power to permit specifications objecting
to discharge to be filed late, where good reason appears and the delay is
not for the purpose of putting improper pressure upon the bankrupt. Simi-
larly, where the Referee accepted the specifications late and later held
hearings on them, he was held to have deliberately extended the time for
filing, even though no express order to that effect was entered." Id. at
273-74. See also Paully v. Magnotti, 182 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1950); Richey
v. Ashton, 143 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Massa, 133 F.2d 191 (2d
Cir. 1943) ; In re Brecher, 4 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1925).
General Order 32 provides that any person opposing a discharge shall
at or before the time fixed for the filing of objections to the discharge
file a specification, in writing, of the grounds of his opposition.
11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1964) provides that the court shall make an order
fixing the time for the filing of objections to the bankrupt's discharge. If the
examination of the bankrupt has not or will not be completed within the
time fixed for the filing of objections, the court on its own motion or on
the motion of the receiver, trustee, a creditor or any other party in inter-
est, or for other cause shown, may extend the time for the filing of such
objection. If no objections are filed within the time fixed, the court shall
grant the discharge. In re Palestine, 75 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1935); United
Wallpaper Factories, Inc. v. Hodges, 70 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1934).
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facie case with respect to his grounds of objections to
the bankrupt's discharge.0 7  If the creditor establishes a
prima facie case, then it may be said that the burden
shifts and the bankrupt is faced with the obligation of
going forward to rebut the proof submitted by the ob-
jecting creditor.' If the court finds that any one of
many specifications has been established, the bankrupt will
be denied his discharge.0 9
The grounds of specifications of objections have been
set forth above."0 Attention is called to the fact that the
107 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1964); Moffett v. Union Bank, 378 F.2d 10 (9th
Cir. 1957); McMullin v. Todd, 228 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1955); In re Hale,
274 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Va. 1967).
If no objection is filed the bankrupt will be granted a discharge. 11
U.S.C. § 32(b) (1964). A debt not scheduled in a prior proceeding is dis-
charged in a subsequent proceeding, filed six years after the granting of
the discharge. Gross v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 302 F.2d 338 (8th Cir.
1962); In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Baker, 275 F.
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
103 Rogers v. Gardner, 226 F2d 864 (9th Cir. 1955).
209A discharge can only be denied on the grounds covered by the ob-
jections filed. In re Little, 65 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Feinsilver,
24 F.2d 40S (2d Cir. 1928).
Additional grounds may not be added after the time fixed for the filing
of specifications has expired, unless the bankrupt has fraudulently concealed
facts. Paully v. Magnotti, 182 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1950); Northeastern Real
Estate Securities Corp. v. Goldstein, 91 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1937); In re
Metcalf, 48 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
lb See mipra note 16. As to the specifications alleging a false oath, see
In re Steiker, 380 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1967).
As to specifications charging false financial statement, see In re Ostrer,
393 F.2d 646 (2 Cir. 1968), as to the need of establishing intent to deceive.
As to specifications charging false oath which must be knowingly and
fraudulently made, see In re Hale, 274 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Va. 1967). In
this case the court held the initial burden of proof is on the objecting
creditor to make out a prima facie case; the grounds for objecting to the
discharge set forth in section 32 of the U.S. Code are exclusive, and unless
one of these grounds is proven his discharge must be granted. The court
also held that the false oath must be knowingly and fraudulently made.
International Shoe Co. v. Kahn, 22 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1927).
As to specifications charging failure to preserve books and records so
that the financial condition could be ascertained, the applicability of this
ground of objection is dependent upon the circumstances of the case, the
business activities and nature of debts of the bankrupt, and the court held
that where the debts were the results of endorsements and guarantees, the
bankrupt was not under any obligation to preserve or keep books with
respect to the obligations arising under the endorsement. In re Halpern,
387 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1968).
The objecting creditor must prove that the financial statement was false
and issued with the intent to defraud. In re Hippler, 278 F. Supp. 753(W.D. La. 1968).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
objections should be alleged in detail, and not in the
language of .the statute, to avoid objections and the need
for an amendment and amplification of the same.
The grounds set forth in § 32(c) of the U.S. Code are
the only grounds of objections to a discharge." It may
be observed that the commission of a preference, or an
act of bankruptcy, such as the execution of an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, or permitting a creditor to
obtain a lien and not repaying the same within 30 days,
or permitting the levy to go to sale, is no ground for
opposition to a bankrupt's discharge." 2
In It re Estate of Northwest Mills, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Ark.
1968), the court held that a written statement purporting to set forth the
true value of a corporation's inventory is a statement respecting the finan-
cial condition of that corporation within the statute making the issuance of
a false financial statement a ground for a denial of a discharge. To bar
a discharge, the financial statement must not only be false but intentionally
so. Intent so as to warrant denial of discharge can be inferred from the
fact that the bankrupt caused to be published what he knew or should have
known to be false. The right to object is not limited to the one who
received the statement but any creditor. Shainman v. Shear's of Affton,
Inc., 387 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
It has been held that the refusal to obey a lawful order of the court,
or answer a material question, or refusal to appear after being subpoenaed,
is grounds for the denial of a discharge. Richardson v. United States, 273
F.2d 144 (8th Cir. 1959); Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th
Cir. 1950); In re Simon, 297 F. 942 (2d Cir. 1924).
But the court must affirmatively approve the questions put to the bank-
rupt, either by overruling the objection or directing the bankrupt to answer.
In re Kolb, 151 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946).
Refusal to answer a question on the ground that it might tend toincriminate is sufficient grounds for the denial of a discharge. It re Harris,
221 U.S. 274 (1911); Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949).
The charge of failure of the bankrupt to satisfactorily explain the loss
of assets or the deficiency to meet his liabilities, must allege the particulars.
It is insufficient to allege this ground in the language of the statute. In
re Korman, 172 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1959); In re Goldstein, 20 F.
Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
The discharge may be opposed by the trustee, creditors, or the U.S.
Attorney. 11 U.S.C. §32(d) (1964).
The referee may not interpose objection to the discharge. In re Walsh,
256 F. 653 (7th Cir. 1919).
But the court may take judicial notice of a prior proceeding and deny
the discharge. In re Hammond, 9 F. Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1934).
M'Bluthenthal v. Jones, 208 U.S. 64 (1908); International Shoe Co. v.
Kahn, 22 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1927).
112 Conduct, no matter how reprehensible, if not embodied within the
grounds set forth in § 32(c) is not a ground for denial of a discharge. 1
W. CoLLrER, BANKRUPTCY 1291 (14th ed. 1967).
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It is worthy to note that there is no obligation to
oppose a discharge on the part of creditors holding a
non-dischargeable debt. These debts are set forth in § 35
of the U.S. Code. Such a debt may be enforced in the
state or appropriate court, notwithstanding the granting
of the discharge. 13
A discharge is effective only as to the creditors
scheduled and those creditors who the bankrupt can prove
had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding, within
six months from the date of the first meeting of creditors
and before the granting of a discharge."4
The bankruptcy court passes on the right to a dis-
charge, not its effect. Whether a particular debt is dis-
chargeable or not, whether it comes within the provisions
of § 35 of the U.S. Code, is a matter for determination by
the state court. Except in the most unusual circum-
stances, (and there is no such case in the second circuit)
the court will refuse to pass upon the issue as to whether
a specific claim is dischargeable or not. It will enjoin
proceedings in the state court pending the granting of
the discharge. It will not enjoin the conduct of state
court proceedings after the granting of the discharge,
instituted for the purpose of determining the non-dis-
chargeability of the debt sought to be enforced."'
There have been many instances of suits being brought
by creditors after the granting of a discharge. These
suits must be defended by the bankrupt, and if the debt
is one that is discharged, he must assert the defense of
313 A property settlement and the obligations thereunder have been held
to be a contract obligation and dischargeable as distinguished from the
obligation to pay alimony. Adler v. Nicholas, 381 F2d 168 (5th Cir.
1967).
The bankruptcy court does not pass upon the dischargeability of a debt.
This is a matter for the state court to determine. In re Courbat, 274 F.
Supp. 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
I4 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1964); It re Lyons, 287 F. 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1922);
Oliver v. Kroff, 143 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1962); Cohen v. Levenstein, 140 Ga.
App. 410, 121 S.E.2d 836 (1961); Application of Keilly, 4 Misc. 2d 99, 262
N.Y.S.2d 310 (Sup. Ct 1965).
"Is Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966); Hilton Credit Corp. v.
Jaggli, 366 F.2d 793 (9th Cr. 1966); Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d 343
(2d Cir. 1946).
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a discharge in bankruptcy. Otherwise he may be faced
with the danger of the recovery of a judgment against
him notwithstanding his discharge.116
Once a discharge is denied on the merits, the debts
involved in that bankruptcy proceeding cannot thereafter
be discharged, regardless of the number of bankruptcy
proceedings that may thereafter ensue.1 On the other
116 Discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish debt but only raises a
bar and discharge must be pleaded. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Sidwell, 382
F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1967).
Debts coming within the provisions of §35(a)(2) include those created
in reliance upon a false financial statement. It is not uncommon for banks
and financial institutions not to oppose a discharge but to bring a suit after
the granting of the same, on the basis that their claims are non-discharge-
able. For an extended discussion of this type of claim and the effect
of the discharge thereon, see First Nat'l Bank v. Haymes, 49 Misc. 2d
939, 268 N.Y.S.2d 820 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966) and cases therein cited.
117In In re Turner's Estate, 268 F. Supp. 918 (D.C. Ore. 1967), the
court held that where the bankrupt had received a discharge in 1958 and
a second petition was filed in 1963 wherein his discharge had been denied
because the proceeding was within six years of the prior petition, and in
1967 the bankrupt filed a third petition, the bankrupt would be denied a
discharge of his debts listed in the schedules of the petition, on the ground
that the denial of the discharge of the 1963 petition was res judicata of the
debts scheduled in the second proceeding. The court pointed out the bank-
rupt could have had the second proceeding, in 1963, dismissed without
prejudice, which would have entitled him to a discharge in the 1967 pro-
ceeding, but that he had failed to do so. The intent of Congress was that
the bankrupt must wait six years before receiving a second discharge.
Accord, Chopnick v. Tokatyan, 128 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1942); Perlman v.
322 West 72nd St. Co., 127 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1942).
Contra, Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1968). In reversing
In re Turner's Estate, 268 F. Supp. 918 (D.C. Ore. 1967), the court held
that under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (5) the "words . . . appear
to constitute no more than a simple direction that a discharge is not to
be granted if the bankrupt has been discharged on a petition filed within
the preceding six years. The language of clause (5) is not directed against
the premature filing of the petition but at the too early grant of a dis-
charge. Clause (5) applies only when the bankrupt 'has been granted a
discharge' on the prior petition. . . . In all cases we believe that the
bankrupt, voluntary and involuntary, ought to be discharged as often as
he makes the showing required by the act ...
The congressional purpose of avoiding too frequent use of the Act to
avoid debt is completely satisfied by denying discharge on any petition
filed within the six-year period. It contributes nothing to this purpose to
deny discharge of the prematurely listed debt on a subsequent petition filed
after the six-year period has elapsed.
'The purpose in adding the ground relating to a prior discharge within
six years was not to punish, but only to postpone a second discharge within
that period of time. .. .'
As noted above, clause (5) was directed against too frequent dis-
charges, not against too frequent petitions and therefore applies only when
a discharge has been granted on the first petition. .. '
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hand, if the bankrupt does obtain his discharge, the
bankrupt in any subsequent proceeding cannot obtain
a second discharge within six years of the first discharge.
There is no limit to the number of discharges a debtor
may obtain provided there is an interval of at least six
years between discharges. 18
A discharge may not be collaterally attacked, and
where an issue has been actually litigated upon objections
to a discharge, the determination is binding on the ob-
jecting creditor in subsequent litigation."9 Proceedings
may be instituted in the court where the discharge was
granted, limited to within one year of the granting of the
same, and based upon the charges of fraud.' In the
absence of fraud, or after the expiration of one year the
discharge cannot be questioned. 2'
The court reversed the District Court and granted a discharge not-
withstanding the fact that the bankrupt had filed a second bankruptcy petition
within five years, eight months and three weeks after filing the first petition,
in which proceeding his discharge was denied because the petition was pre-
maturely filed, and filed the present petition three years thereafter, or nearly
nine years after being discharged upon the first petition.
This decision represents a new trend or interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and may open the doors in the discharge of debts heretofore
considered non-dischargeable where scheduled in the second prematurely filed
proceeding.
Us In. re Hale, 274 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Va. 1967), objection was made
to the bankrupt's discharge on the ground that he had been granted two
previous discharges on voluntary petitions and that the third discharge was
sought shortly after the expiration of the six-year period after the second
discharge. The objection was on the ground it would be "highly inequit-
able" to allow the bankrupt to evade his just debts and pervert the pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Act. The court in answering this argument states:
"One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy statute is to give the
honest debtor the opportunity to reinstate himself in the business world by
relieving him of the payment of his dischargeable debts. . . It is well
established that a bankrupt is not to be denied a discharge on general equi-
table principles but only when one or more statutory grounds of objection
are proven. Johnson v. Bockman, 282 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1960)."
119Meyers v. Int'l Trust Co., 263 U.S. 64 (1923); Matawan Bank v.
Feldman, 12 N.J. Misc. 785, 174 A. 442 (1934).
12011 U.S.C. §33 (1964).
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SUMMARY
A proceeding is initiated by the filing of a petition,
whether voluntary or involuntary, with the clerk of the
court. In due order the proceedings are referred to a
referee who will remain in charge of the administration
of the proceeding to its close. All obligations of whatever
nature should be addressed to the referee in bankruptcy
in charge of the proceeding.
The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction not
only to determine the validity and the amount due upon
all claims asserted against the assets of the bankrupt
estate in the possession of the receiver-trustee, but also
with respect to any and all claims filed in the proceeding
seeking to participate in the distribution of the assets.
The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to restrain the
institution of foreclosure proceedings of any lien or en-
cumbrance sought to be instituted after the filing of the
petition. It has jurisdiction to grant affirmative relief
as against creditors upon counterclaims and offsets arising
out of the transactions for which a proof of claim has
been filed.
The trustee is vested not only with the rights of the
bankrupt but also with the rights of creditors under state
law, as well as the additional rights granted under the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act is also an avenue of economic
rehabilitation of the bankrupt. If he has not committed
any act which would bar his discharge and if the debts
are discharged, his discharge will have the effect of
relieving him of all prior indebtedness, and he can go
forward and establish himself, once again, economically
free of debts.
This is a humane statute, intended not only for the
benefit of the debtor, who has become involved beyond
his ability to pay his obligations, but also for the benefit
of the creditors to assure equitable and pro-rata distribu-
tion to all creditors alike.
[ VOL.. 43
